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In this paper, we show that delegation of monetary policy to an independent and more 
conservative central banker is an optimal policy in a multi-country framework with monetary 
spillovers among countries, even in the absence of time inconsistency (credibility) issues. We also 
study the we\fare implications of delegating monetary policy and extend our analysis to the case 
of coordination of monetary policies. 
1. Introduction 
Some recent studies have shown that an individual may be able to commit 
to a given action if her choice is delegated to another individual with the 
suitable preferences.! In this paper we apply this general principIe to an 
international monetary policy game of the type firstly studied by Canzoneri 
and Gray (1985). We analyse the incentives of national governments to 
delegate the control of monetary policy to independent central bankers with 
their own output-inflation preferences. Delegation is used by governments as 
a device to commit to a given monetary policy in the context of a heavily 
interrelated world economy. 
Correspondence to: Juan J. Dolado, Bank of Spain, Madrid, Spain. 
*We are grateful to J. Ayuso, D. Cohen, J.M. González, D. Laskar, J. Mélitz, R. Repullo, 1. 
Viñals, C. Wyplosz, two anonymous referees and participants in seminars in Madrid and Paris 
for their helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. 
lFor example, Vickers (1984), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Gatsios and Karp (1991). 
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We focus on a two-stage monetary game where governments first choose 
the type of central bankers in charge of their respective monetary policies, 
and secondly, central bankers set the money growth rates for their own 
countries. 2 We concentrate on a two-country world economy where coun-
tries have structurally identical economies but are endowed with different 
output-inflation preferences. The two economies are interrelated through 
monetary spillovers (positive or negative) which link output growth at home 
with foreign monetary policy. In this framework, Canzoneri and Gray (1985) 
showed that countries under-expand (over-expand) their money supplies in 
reaction to a negative common supply shock when monetary spillovers 
across countries are positive (negative). 
Delegation of monetary policy on independent central bankers character-
ises the equilibrium of this monetary game. Note that the novel result in this 
paper is that delegation arises beca use of the existence of monetary spillovers 
across countries in an international context, and in the absence of any time 
inconsistency issues stemming from the lack of credibility of the monetary 
authorities. 3 ,4 
Each government delegates its monetary policy to an independent and 
more conservative (that is, with a greater dislike for inflation) central banker 
in order to commit to a tighter monetary policy. When monetary spillovers 
are positive this forces the other country to act as a locomotive bearing the 
inflationary costs of the world adjustment to the common shock. Further-
more, since both countries choose conservative bankers, delegation imposes 
an additional deflationary bias onto the world economy and this makes both 
countries worse off. On the contrary, in a world with negative monetary 
spillovers, delegation helps reducing the excessive rates of money growth 
without a large cost in terms of output. Delegation of monetary policy in this 
latter case is thus welfare improving. 
The incentives of national governments to mis-represent their true output-
2We consider this to be the natural sequence of policy choices. The decision to set up an 
independent central banker in charge of monetary policy is a long-run decision which in many 
cases is a constitutional matter, and in most other cases cannot be easily reversed. This contrasts 
with the setting of money growth rates which can be modified with a greater frequency. 
3Following the analysis in Barro and Gordon (1983), RogofT (1985a, b) showed how delegation 
to an independent and conservative central banker may solve the time inconsistency problem 
which characterises monetary policy intertemporally. See also Buiter and Marston (1985), 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), Currie et al. (1989) for the possibility of 'importing' credibility in 
an open economy. A complementary approach to our paper can be found in Laskar (1990) and 
Alesina and Grilli (1992) who analyse delegation of monetary policy in an international context. 
However, in their papers delegation arises mainly because of the existence of time-inconsistency 
problems. Furthermore, delegation is always welfare reducing which is shown in our paper not 
to be necessarily true. 
4If credibility issues were incorporated to our model, our resuIts on delegation would 'be 
strengthened when supply shocks are symmetric. Ir shocks were asymmetric there would be 
counteracting efTects of the type analysed by Alesina and Grilli (1992). 
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inflation preferences are also present when monetary policies are coordinated 
by a supra-national authority but where there is no cooperation in the 
choice of central bankers. Again, governments pretend to dislike inflation to 
a larger extent than they truly do independently of the sign of the monetary 
spillovers. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
In section 3, we analyse the choice of central banker when monetary policy is 
made at a national level while section 4 deals with the case of coordinated 
monetary policies. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
Two countries with closely interrelated economies, A and B, play a 
two-stage monetary policy game. In the first stage, or delegation stage, the 
government of each country chooses (independently and simultaneously) the 
type of central banker to whom delega te monetary policy. In the second 
stage, the central bankers previously elected set simultaneously money 
growth rates for their respective countries. 
The (output-inflation) preferences of government i (i = A, B) are given by 
the following quadratic utility function: 
V¡ = -1/2(y; + Pinf), i = A, B. (1) 
Governments value negatively deviations around an optimal value of zero 
inflation, and also deviations of total output from a given equilibrium value. 
(Both such deviations are denoted by ni and Yi, respectively.) Note that Pi ~O 
represents the true government i's relative preferences between output and 
inflation. A larger value of Pi shows a proportionately greater dislike for 
inflation. 
Let Vi ~ O index the different types of central bankers who are available to 
government i (i = A, B) at the delegation stage. Government i chooses Vi (we 
shall denote by vf the actually chosen value of IJ¡) to maximise its utility V¡ 
knowing that the country's money growth rates will be chosen to maximise 
the output-inflation preferences of the elected central banker, 
V¡ = -1/2(y; + vfnf). (2) 
No delegation occurs when vf = Pi. 5 Otherwise, an independent central 
banker with different output-inflation preferences is let to rule monetary 
policy. 
5Note that even though (2) is the relevant objective function for the second stage subgame, the 
equilibrium outcomes of the overall game have to be judged according to eq. (1). 
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Finally, the two-country economy is summarised by the following spillover 
equations;6 
(3) 
(4) 
where i,j=A,B and i#j; 1 >a1 > I a2 1 ~O; and, z~O. 
Deviations of output depend on the domestic and foreign money growth 
rates and an unfavourable supply shock, z ~ O. Inflation is assumed to 
depend only on the country's own money growth rate. 7 Note that al is 
assumed to be positive, that is, a fas ter expansion of the domes tic money 
supply increases domestic output. No sign can be imposed a priori on a2 
because the transmission of monetary shocks across countries may have 
ambiguous effects,8 yet it is assumed that the domestic monetary multiplier, 
al' is larger than the foreign monetary multiplier I a2 1. 
In what follows, we shall study the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of 
this two-stage monetary game. 
3. Delegating monetary policy to independent central banks 
We begin analysing the choice of central bankers when monetary spillovers 
are positive, a2 > O. Then, we extend our analysis to the case of negative 
spillovers, a2 < O. 
3.1. Equilibrium money growth rates 
Given the output-inflation preferences of the central bankers elected at the 
delegation stage, VA and v:, the equilibrium money growth rates of countries 
A and B, mA and mB satisfy 
Lemma 1.9 Far any pair (vA, v:), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium,far 
the second stage subgame. In this equilibrium money growth rates are given by 
6This two-country model is a simplified version of Canzoneri and Gray (1985). We as sume for 
simplicity that both countries are structurally identical and may dilTer only in their output-
inflation preferences. Nevertheless, our basic intuitions will also apply to an asymmetric version 
of this model. Furthermore, our basic result will also extend naturally to an n-country version of 
this model. 
7This simplifying assumption makes the algebra less cumbersome and sharpens the theoretical 
ressults. N~te that even. if mj does not alTect lIi, it does alTect V, through its impact on Yi (i#j). 
There IS hule empmcal consensus on the sign, let alone the size, of the spillovers. Frankel 
(1988) presents a survey of the various transmission mechanisms and compares them with the 
predictions of the leading multi-country macro-econometric models. ' 
9The proof of this lemma is trivial and can be found in the working paper version of this 
article [Dolado et al. (1992)]. 
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When monetary spillovers are positive, the money growth rates of the two 
countries are strategic substitutes (see fig. 1):10 If country B increases its rate 
of monetary expansion A's output grows faster. Hence, there is less need for 
an increase in A's money growth rate, mA , and some additional scope to fight 
A's inflation via a reduction of its money growth rate mA-
An increase in B's money growth rate thus creates a positive externality on 
country A and vice versa. The Nash equilibrium described in Lemma 1 is 
characterised by sub-optimally low money growth rates precisely because 
countries fail to internalise this positive externality. (Note that 8V¡/8m¡ >0 at 
m¡ =m{.) 
3.2. The delegatian game 
Government i (i = A, B) chooses the output-inflation preferences of its 
central banker, v~ to maximize its objective function V; as given in eq. (1). 
Note that under the current assumption that monetary spillovers are 
IOIn the terminology of Bulow et al. (1985). 
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positive, if country i chooses vt > J1.¡, that is, if it delegates on a conservative 
central banker, i.e., a banker with tougher preferences against inflation, then 
it commits country i to a lower rate of monetary growth for any rate of 
money growth of country j. Furthermore, country j is induced to raise its 
own rate of money growth, mj , to offset the deflationary impact on its output 
of country i's monetary contraction. 
From Lemma 1, if vt > J1.¡, then country i's equilibrium money growth rate 
falls (omr;ov¡ <O) while country j's equilibrium money growth rate increases 
(omj/ov¡ >0). (Fig. 1 presents this argument diagrammatically for the case 
where country A chooses vi> J1.A' Note that with positive spillovers, country 
A's welfare is increased at the new equilibrium.) 
Proposition l. There is a unique perfect equilibrium for the delegation game. 
In this equilibrium, the governments of both countries delegate their monetary 
policies to independent and more conservative central bankers i.e., vt = 
J1.¡(vj +ai)/(vj +ai -a~)~J1.¡ ~O i,j=A, B; i#j. 
Proo! See appendix. 
Delegation of monetary policy to an independent and conservative central 
banker is indeed a dominant strategy for countries with interrelated econo-
mies. It is easy to show that, for any value of v'!' ov/ov. is positive at v· =11.' J ' l l l l 
as long as az #0. Furthermore, the more integrated are the economies of the 
two countries (the larger az), the greater is the incentive to delegate on a 
conservative banker, ovt /oa z > O. Only if the two economies were completely 
isolated from each other (a z = O), the strategic incentives to delegate on a 
conservative banker would vanish. 11 
Delegation of monetary policies exacerbates the intrinsic deflationary bias 
of the world economy when monetary spillovers are positive. In Proposition 
1 we saw that in equilibrium each country chooses a conservative central 
banker to run its monetary policy which implies lower equilibrium money 
growth rates than in the absence of delegation, mt( vi, v: ) ~ m7(J1.A, J1.B)' 
Hence, delegation makes both countries worse off. 12 Fig. 1 aboye illustrates 
the sub-optimality of the perfect equilibrium of the delegation game (PE) 
with respect to the Nash equilibrium of the monetary policy game when 
policy cannot be delegated (N). 
Assume, for simplicity, that the output-inflation preferences of both 
countries are symmetric, i.e., J1.A = J1.B = 11.. Then, in equilibrium each country 
delegates on a central banker with preferences given implicitly by 
. 11 Delegation to a conserva ti ve central banker is only optimal in a c10sed economy framework 
If there are important time inconsistency problems afTecting monetary policy (see RogofT 
(1985a)]. 
12The delegation game behaves Iike a typical prisoners' dilemma when a2 >0. 
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(5) 
From eq. (5), ov* /011. > 0, that is, the more averse to inflation are the two 
countries, the more conservative are the central bankers in charge of 
monetary policy. Now if, for instance, country A were to become more 
inflation averse, dJ1.A> 0, it would tend to choose a more conservative central 
banker than country B. Note that OV1l0J1.A~0~OV:/OJ1.A so that vi~v:. 
Furthermore, country A would also distort its true output-inflation prefer-
ences proportionately more than country B, that is, J1.A> J1.B implies vi/J1.A > 
vV J1.B' In fig. 2, an increase from J1.A = J1.B to J1.A> J1.B shifts the equilibrium of 
the delegation game from Do to DI illustrating these two comments. 
3.3. The case of negative spillovers 
The analysis of this latter case is basically identical to that in the previous 
subsections. In particular, Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 are still valid if az is 
set to be negative. For az <0, money growth rates are strategic complements 
rather than strategic substitutes and, therefore, monetary reaction functions 
are upward sloping (see fig. 3). An increase in B's money growth rate 
decreases A's output and induces A to increase its monetary growth rate to 
offset the fall in its output. 
4
1064 J.J. Dolado et al., Delegation in international monetary poliey games 
Fig.3 
From Lemma 1, the Nash equilibrium for the second stage subgame is 
characterised by excessive monetary growth because countries fail to inter-
nalise the negative monetary externality that they impose on each other. 
[Note that the two countries are better off if the equilibrium is located to the 
South-West of (N) where money growth rates are low.] 
As in the case of positive spillovers, each country has an incentive to 
delega te on conservative central bankers. In fact, 8 V¡/8v¡ at V¡ = /l¡ is positive 
irrespective of the sign of az. By delegating its monetary policy to a highly 
inflation averse central banker a country commits to a tighter monetary 
policy which helps against inflation, damages output at home and increases 
output abroad. 
In equilibrium both countries implement a tight monetary policy by means 
of delegation because the positive effects on inflation outweigh the deterio-
ration of output. Furthermore, delegation makes both countries better off by 
reducing the excessive monetary growth which characterises the monetary 
game with negative spillovers. This again can be observed in fig. 3, where the 
perfect equilibrium of the delegation game (PE) is located to the South-West 
of point (N), that is, in the area of increased utility for both countries. 
4. Strategic manipulation oC coordinated monetary policies 
Suppose that national monetary policies are coordinated by a Supra-
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national Monetary Authority (SMA)13 but that central bankers are still 
chosen non-cooperatively. The SMA sets mA , mB, the money growth rates of 
the two countries, to maximise joint welfare W(mA, mB) = V A + VB' where VA 
and VB are given in eq. (2) aboye. Note that the SMA's decisions on money 
growth take as given the output-inflation preferences declared by the 
member countries (A and B), VA and VB' in the first stage of the monetary 
game. Those preferences will not generally coincide with the true preferences 
/lA' /lB' Solving the SMA's problem, we obtain the following result: 
Lemma 2. 14 For any pair (VA,VB), the money growth rates set by the SMA 
are given by 
m¡ =(a1 +az)[vj +(a1 -az)Z]z/Ll', 
where Ll' =(vA +ai +aD(vB +ai +aD -4aia~. 
i,j = A, B, i =1= j, 
We can compare the money growth rates that prevail when monetary 
policies are coordinated (m' s) with the rates that would have prevailed had 
country retained control of its monetary policy (m*' s). For simplicity, assume 
that VA=VB=V~O (i.e., declared preferences are symmetric). Then, it is easy 
to see from Lemmas 1 and 2 that sign [m=m*]=sign[vazJ. Therefore, when 
az is positive, the SMA reduces the deflationary bias of independent 
monetary policies, internalising the (positive) monetary externalities between 
its member countries. However, when az is negative, the SMA eliminates the 
excessive money growth rates that characterised the non-cooperative solu-
tion. Coordination of monetary policy leads to Pareto efficiency. (For the 
sake of brevity, we shall concentrate on the case of positive spillovers in the 
rest of this section.) 
Note that at mi = mi, 8V¡/8m¡ is negative for all i which means that each 
country would prefer a lower money growth rate than that imposed by the 
SMA. Country i thus has an incentive to declare a greater dislike for 
inflation than the truly held in order to induce the SMA to set a lower m¡ 
(and also a higher money growth rate for country j, m), an action which 
unambiguously benefits country i. Note that 8mj8v¡<O and 8m)8v¡>O 
where i,j = A,B and i =1= j. 
As in the previous section, countries choose their declared preferences, now 
denoted by Vi' simultaneously and non-cooperatively to maximise their 
respective objective functions as given in (1). 
13An instance of an SMA are the G7 rneetings where the rnost industrialised countries 
'coordina te' their rnonetary policies. Studies on rnonetary policy coordination inc1ude Oudiz 
(1985) and Oudiz and Sachs (1984). 
14The proof of this lernrna is trivial and hence ornitted. 
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Proposition 2. In equilibrium, each country declares output-inflation prefer-
ences, Vi' which involve a greater dislike for inflation than the truly held. That 
is, v¡ ~ /1¡ ~ ° for all i. 
Proo! See appendix. 
For the symmetric case where /1A = /1B = /1, both countries declare output-
inflation preferences equal to 
(6) 
Comparing (6) and (5) aboye, we conclude that the incentives to distort the 
true output-inflation preferences are increased when monetary policy is not 
carried out at the national level but by an SMA. Since the SMA tends to 
overexpand monetary policy with respect to the non-cooperative solution 
when monetary spillovers are positive, the need for commitment to a tighter 
monetary stance is greater. Thus, governments distort their true preferences 
to a larger extent. 
Only if the SMA were restricted to set mA = mB =m, governments' incen-
tives to manipulate the SMA via distortion of their true output-inflation 
preferences would disappear. In this case, a simultaneous contraction of 
domestic monetary growth rates and a monetary expansion abroad is no 
longer feasible. 15 
The distortion of the output-inflation preferences of governments clearly 
affects the optimality properties of a coordinated monetary policy. The SMA 
can no longer achieve Pareto efficient outcomes. When /1A = /1B = /1, making 
use of (5) and (6), we can establish unambiguous welfare comparisons 
between different forms or organising monetary policy. For instance when 
az > 0, the welfare ordering is: monetary policy organised by an SMA, an 
SMA with manipulation of preferences, independent national monetary 
policies, and finally, independent monetary policies with delegation to 
conservative central bankers. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that the incentive to delegate monetary 
policy on independent central bankers is not solely connected with time 
15Existence of equilibrium for the oyerall game with mA = mB = m requires that there is enough 
conYergence between the output-inflation preferences of the two countries. More precisely, 
!lA = !lB' When mA = mB, each country would like the SMA to behaye under its own output-
inflation preferences. The interests of both countries with respect to the SMA are only 
compatible if their underlying output-inflation preferences do coincide. This is precisely the well-
known principie that maintaining fixed exchange rates requires a common monetary policy. (See 
working paper yersion for a formal proof of this result.) 
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inconsistency (credibility) problems. We show that the existence of monetary 
spillovers in a multi-country framework also leads to the delegation of 
monetary policies. 
Governments choose more conservative central bankers as a way to 
commit to a more restrictive monetary policy independently of the sign of 
the monetary spillovers. However, the sign of these spillovers determines the 
welfare implications of delegation. If these spillovers are positive, delegation 
is welfare reducing but if, on the contrary, they are negative delegation 
makes every country better off. 
We finally show that the incentives to distort the true output-inflation 
preferences of each government are still present even if monetary policies are 
coordinated by a supra-national authority. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Given that 
JI; = - 1/2(y¡ + /1¡m¡), i = A, B, 
the first-order condition W.r.t. v¡ is 
8J1;/8v¡ = (8J1;/8m¡)(8m;/8v¡) + (8J1;/8mJ( 8m)81J¡) 
From Lemma 1 we have 
Hence 
that is 
vr =/1¡[(vj + aD/(vj + ai -am 
with i,j = A, B and i =1= j. 
The second-order condition for a maximum, after substituting the first-
order condition is 
with 
Since 
sign (8m;/8v¡) <0, 
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then 
sign (o2J!¡/ovi)=sign (ai-ai-vJ<O 
given that al> I a21 >0 and vj >0. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
From Lemma 2 
where 
Hence 
oJ!¡/ov¡ = - [y¡al + {l¡m¡ - y¡a2Yj]( om¡jov¡) = O 
implies that 
Following the same argument as in Proposition 1, it is easy to show that 
the second-order condition for a maximum aIso holds. 
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